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It is possible and desirable to consider many NASA human spaceflight scenarios, along 
with all their elements, within a long-term NASA budget context. While there is an abundance 
of cost analysis of specific space system elements in a narrow context or performance analysis 
of broad scenarios with no NASA budget context, approaches that balance the details in-hand 
alongside a NASA budget context across possible scenarios have been absent. 
This situation is not for lack of enough data, understanding, cost models or mission 
definition. Uncertainty in selecting or having a mandate for a specific spaceflight direction 
should not be cause to avoid looking at any scenarios at all, especially if many very different 
scenarios can be analyzed rather well. Insufficient emphasis on a NASA budget context as an 
input into long term planning, the treatment of budgets and schedules as an output of 
proposed initiatives, rather than an input, and a lack of understanding of NASA budget-
nuances likely all contribute to the lack of life cycle cost analysis for spaceflight scenarios. 
Given the importance of a NASA budget context, life cycle cost modeling and analysis for 
NASA’s spaceflight pioneering investments cannot afford to ignore where or who and the 
types of money in the NASA budget. Similarly, valuing situational awareness, it is not 
advantageous or necessary to await a specific mandate or decision only to analyze slight 
variations on that single directions life cycle costs later. This is akin to being in the wilderness, 
but refusing to explore your surroundings until after a decision on which way to go -and then 
proceeding strictly in that direction. Rather, reconnaissance in many directions is valuable, 
feedback on which way to go, regardless of uncertainty about eventual choices. 
The modeling and analysis here will show that it is not necessary to define every part of 
every possible space exploration scenario in order to gain valuable insights. A scenario 
planning approach that explores many life cycle possibilities is valuable and feasible, by 
combining the more defined space system elements alongside a thorough understanding of 
NASA budgets as context.  This provides defined and valuable insights for “that which 
remains”. A scenario exploration strategy of “that which remains” takes the more defined 
elements, places these into potential, but defined, budget scenarios, and outputs valuable 
insights for the less defined elements. From this process, the necessary affordability and 
productivity characteristics of “that which remains” are refined. In addition, the 
understanding of the scenario as a whole improves. This paper presents such an approach, via 
cost modeling and analysis, reviewing many space exploration scenarios within a NASA 
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budget and inflation context, a purchase power context, with a detailed understanding of 
NASA-speak and NASA practice in properly accounting for all costs. 
Scenarios where the International Space Station (ISS) ends and those where the ISS does 
not end in the scenarios horizon are considered. Within this backdrop, scenarios include:  
potential reusable launch vehicles (Falcon 9-Reusable and others), existing expendable launch 
vehicles (Falcon 9, Delta IV Heavy), potential space transportation systems in development 
(the Space Launch System, the Falcon Heavy), potential spacecraft in development (Orion, 
Commercial Crew, future variants, etc.), and potential in-space infrastructure (for in-space 
refueling of Earth departure stages) for lunar, asteroid and Mars exploration scenarios. 
Important links between what and how, technical and non-technical factors, and how these 
affect costs, are shown. Given budgetary pressures, it is no longer possible to ignore non-
technical drivers of industry / partner costs as has been past practice in cost modeling. 
Commercial space scenarios are explored at many levels, where “how” a system is acquired 
by NASA and developed and made by industry partners, existing or emerging, is as important 
as “what” is delivered or provided. Processes and practices by industry partners, from 
business-as-usual to improved “best practices” established in non-aerospace, but complex, 
applications, are shown as crucial to scenarios that further NASA’s space exploration efforts. 
A sampling of the many scenarios that can be explored with the cost model are presented 
in this paper. The cost model will also be reviewed, one part being a launcher focused cost 
model, another being a broader exploration systems scenario cost model. Non-recurring 
development, recurring manufacturing, and recurring operations across multiple elements, 
from flight to ground systems, from launch, to in-space elements, to surface systems, are 
addressed. Graphical results and the insights from these are presented - a reference for the 
possible life cycle costs and implications of many scenarios, element by element, across life 
cycle phases. 
Nomenclature 
COTS = Commercial Orbital Transportation Services 
CPS = Cryogenic Propulsion Stage 
CRS = Cargo Resupply Services 
DOD = Department of Defense 
EDS = Earth Departure Stage 
EUS = Exploration Upper Stage 
HEO = Human Exploration and Operations 
ICPS = Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage 
ISRU = In-situ Resource Utilization 
ISS =  International Space Station 
LCC = Life Cycle Cost 
LEO = Low Earth Orbit 
LH2 = Liquid Oxygen 
LOX = Liquid Hydrogen 
LSP = Launch Services Program 
R&D = Research and Development 
SCaN = Spacecraft Communications and Navigation 
SFS =  Space Flight Support 
SLS = Space Launch System 
STMD = Space Technology Mission Directorate 
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I. Introduction 
hree factors drive the development of quantifiable NASA human spaceflight scenarios looking to the next decade 
- the key word being “quantifiable” and referring to life cycle costs. Of course, choices, pressures, technical and 
non-technical factors (economics, demographics, politics, societal trends and constraints, etc.) will affect specific 
content, but all the content and their interactions will manifest itself inside broad scenarios that are all about context. 
The three factors driving scenarios as context are: 
 
1) The growth rate of the NASA budget 
2) The rate of cost inflation for the aerospace goods and services NASA acquires 
3) The future of the International Space Station (ISS), or more broadly, the degree to which a human presence 
in low Earth orbit (LEO) persists in the NASA portfolio 
 
Any quantified life cycle costs (LCC) for any NASA human spaceflight scenario will live, so to speak, inside a 
box the sides of which are a scenario set by variations of the prior three factors. Any architecture, launch rate, space 
systems elements, schedules, goals, or achievements, the milestones of progress and relevance, will reside inside a 
“budget” X “inflation” X “future NASA LEO presence” box. 
While other smaller factors in the NASA budget mix, and their resources, could act in combination to heavily 
influence the context in which future NASA space exploration scenarios beyond Earth orbit will dwell, it is the three 
factors listed that will prove most significant in the next decade acting individually as well as in combination. 
II. The NASA Budget, Inflation and the Last Decade 
Figure 1 shows the NASA budget since 2003. Transitions and markers indicate significant changes in the 
placement of NASA resources related to changes in direction and events. 
 
 
Figure 1. The NASA budget since 2003. Transitions in accounting, the start and end of major programs, and the 
movement of resources for new capabilities, alongside a consideration of inflation. 
 
Because the availability of resources is so critical to future spaceflight scenarios, it’s worth highlighting some key 
observations that come from visualizing the NASA budget data (“actuals” as they are called) within this specific sand 
chart. This is necessary as we set the table for diverse, specific NASA space exploration scenarios ahead. Dispelling 
myths and more accurately predicting the behavior, limitations and nature of the budget box for future scenarios is 
another purpose in reviewing the NASA budget from the past decade as we look ahead at the next. 
Significant budget observations, significant because of their usefulness for future planning purposes, supported by 
the data in Figure 1, include- 
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1) The importance of developing a proper context about future NASA budget shifts: In the aftermath of 
the decision to end the Space Shuttle program, a general sense that 100% of the Space Shuttle funds would 
be available to what-ever came after would have been woefully incorrect. Yet such a notion did arise at the 
policy level1. What was missing was context. For one, context that the ISS would still require US cargo, crew 
and their launch support, meaning budget resources. Second, that the date of the end of the ISS program was 
beyond the then current political-cycle, and soon (six years, or 2016) after construction would have been 
declared complete (2010). That is to say, the scenario for freeing up Shuttle and ISS funds totally, for 
planning purposes, was beyond uncertain, unstudied and destined to be incorrect. 
 
2) The importance in large program transitions of seeing standing capabilities in NASA that may not be 
readily apparent: Large-scale NASA programs may carry standing capabilities within their own books. This 
goes unnoticed until that program ends. Then, NASA provides resources to the standing capability, perhaps 
from new programs. The dollars received by the new program are now less than expected, less than might 
have been advertised for the new programs planning purposes (and to planning people). By way of analogy, 
though as much about labor as infrastructure, if sounding like too much NASA-speak (or accountants hiding 
off shore bank accounts), if you are keeping a large property, and the main tenant leaves, the costs of 
maintaining the large building may remain as high as when fully occupied. One example of this is visible in 
Figure 1 in the “SFS (incl. SCaN, LSP, et al.)” item. Notice how the thickness of the sand for this item, its 
budget, goes significantly up after the end of the Shuttle program. The cost of many Space Flight Support 
(SFS) functions was always there. No new cost appeared, just that this line item had many resources book-
kept under the Shuttle program. That cost was just more apparent once it stepped out from under the Shuttle 
programs budget umbrella. Other areas in NASA, like “Cross Agency Support”, are also standing 
capabilities, but accounting changes separated these since 2007 precisely to provide clarity.  
 
The budget graph, in its raw data, reveals- 
 
1) NASA’s budget has increased on average 1.175% per year since 2003. That is, taking the 2003 NASA 
budget, and increasing it at 1.175% yearly, including compounding, yields the 2015 NASA budget. 
 
2) NASA’s purchasing power has declined 15% from 2003 to 2015. Using the official NASA Inflation Index2  
yields a 15% decline in NASA’s purchasing power from 2003 to 2015. Given the lack of certainty about 
something as complex as cost inflation across so many different projects, products and organizations, 
alternative scenarios about what may be happening here will be explored ahead. 
 
3) The end of the operational portion of NASA’s Space Shuttle program freed up for other purposes 
$860M in 2013, two years after the Shuttle last flight, and less, $360M a year by 2015. The nuanced 
words here in saying that little, if any, Shuttle operations funding was actually freed up to other purposes 
after the end of the Shuttle program are the words “operational” and “other purposes”. The funding of a new 
program line, the Constellation program, later the Space Launch System (SLS), Orion and the Ground 
Operations project, received budget resources since 2005 mostly from the more immediate end of the Space 
Shuttle’s standing capability development, “upgrades” and related investment budgets. There was no further 
need to fund investments in Shuttle improvements because it was already a decision that the Shuttle would 
fly only until it completed the ISS construction. Specific “operational” space transportation funds from the 
Shuttle have remained as “operational” space transportation funds for the ISS – almost to the dollar, per 
official, public NASA budget documents‡. These became the ISS Crew (Soyuz) & Cargo (Commercial), and 
US Commercial Crew programs. 
 
More NASA budget and cost inflation scenarios lie ahead. Scenarios range from the nominal, where budgets go 
up in the future just as they have historically, and using an official NASA Inflation Index for costs, to where conditions 
may be more optimistic or pessimistic, and why. 
  
                                                          
‡ Notably, any measure of funds alone is incomplete without considering improvements in the flexibility with which the funds can be applied; a 
service model by way of example having an ability to buy-by-the-yard, unlike an acquisition model more akin to ownership, including fixed, less 
flexible, long term commitments and costs. The private sector refers to this as supply chain flexibility, measuring the ability of a supply chain to 
adjust costs up or down as requirements change. 
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III. The Future of ISS and NASA’s Presence in Low Earth Orbit 
After budgets and inflation, the third factor that will significantly affect the sides of a scenarios box, the context 
into which future NASA exploration scenarios will or will not fit well, is the future of the ISS. As of 2014, NASA and 
the current administration have committed to “an extension of the International Space Station (ISS) until at least 
2024.3” 
As with the decision to end the Space Shuttle program, planners might again be tempted to take all the ISS related 
layers of sand in Figure 1, the US commercial cargo and crew services, ISS research and development (R&D), and 
the ISS operations funds, and put these amounts 100% toward plans for the next big thing. Two considerations must 
give this pause. One, the experience with the end of the Space Shuttle program showed that budgets might not be what 
they appear to be, that caution, context and a proper understanding of the inner workings of any budget lines is 
necessary. Second, the NASA associate administrator for human spaceflight, William H. Gerstenmaier, has already 
indicated that even were the ISS to end in 2024, a NASA’s presence in low Earth orbit will not. Rather (quote) “we 
can just buy these services”4 from private sector space stations. As NASA’s presence in LEO would not end after the 
end of the ISS, even the temptation to show a diversion of ISS related budgets after some date could not reasonably 
begin with planning for 100% of funds becoming available for other uses. 
With the previous cautions in mind, delving into the ISS budget lines (2015) finds- 
 
1) ISS Operations          ~ $1.2 billion a year 
 
2) ISS R&D, the use of the ISS      ~ $300 million a year 
 
3) ISS Cargo & Crew, Transportation and Related ~ $2.4 billion a year 
 
Total International Space Station =    ~ $3.9 billion a year 
 
Learning from the Shuttle program ending, and its experience, names may not be as telling as they appear. First, 
the ISS operations are in some portion the task of any NASA in-space operations, mission control and mission 
operations, performed mostly at the Johnson Space Center. There would be reason to be cautious about how much of 
this funding would be available for post-ISS programs (including the possibility –very little). 
Second, considering partnerships with the private sector for a continued low Earth orbit NASA presence (Figure 
2), buying services from private sector space stations, an immediate question would be how to get NASA astronauts 
to these private stations. Would the private sector space station bundle the ride, and cargo arrangements along with 
the person-hours of time NASA is buying (as if renting, rather than owning)? Any consideration of what happens to 
the largest ISS budget line item, the $2.4 billion a year to get US crew and their cargo to the station would have to 
address how far such transport costs to NASA may have improved, a space transportation cost that could be unrelated 
to the progress of private space stations. By way of considering scenarios, would a reduction in the number of NASA 
astronauts at a private station, and a minor improvement in crew and cargo launch costs, mean cargo and crew 
transportation costs drop 50%? That would mean $1.2 billion a year in a post-ISS / private space stations scenario that 
(for just this one line item of the total ISS costs) would be unavailable to future programs in that post-ISS world. 
It is not difficult to envision post-ISS scenarios that yield very low, nominal and high amounts of post-ISS funding 
for projects that follow. The ISS budget numbers when understood, self-describe the conditions necessary to count 
funds more or less towards future NASA projects. Some of these conditions will sound very reasonable, others less 
so. 
More post-ISS scenarios lie ahead§. Scenarios range from the nominal, as regards a 2024 planning date for an-end-
of-ISS budget transition to start, to the off nominal (“when” may be 20285), with variations on how budgets may or 
may not free up, where and why - for future projects such as Mars exploration. 
 
                                                          
§ Scenarios for ISS cost improvements in the near term, reduced ISS and related budgets at the same capability or greater than current, but before 
2024, are not considered here, for lack of any NASA statements to-date on this regard. This possibility may arise naturally as part of post-ISS 
planning, as well as in forward work building on the merger of scenarios and analysis here. 
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Figure 2. The Bigelow Expandable Activity Module (BEAM). In 2015, a mission to the ISS will attach this module, 
demonstrating technology for future space stations. (Public domain photo; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bigelow_Expandable_Activity_Module#/media/File:BEAM_press_conference_01.jpg) 
 
IV. NASA Human Exploration & Operations 
Figure 3 will be the canvas chosen for painting specific NASA human space flight and space exploration scenarios. 
The particular line of interest will be the blue line, the Exploration budget of about $3 billion a year. In later years, 
2024 to 2028 and beyond, the red lines will become important, as the fate of NASA’s presence in low Earth orbit can 
take assorted paths. A reasonable scenario assumption (for starters) will apply to the black line items, assorted 
research, support and other standing functions, assumed to carry on steadily in support of whatever may come. 
 
 
Figure 3. NASA Human Exploration & Operations Budgets. Note that this view excludes the Space Technology 
Mission Directorate (STMD), which is a separate directorate and fund line, apart from, and at the same level, as the 
NASA Human Exploration & Operations (HEO) funds. 
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V. Scenario Variable 1: NASA’s Purchase Power 
Changing only one variable a time helps to simplify the exploration of scenarios. NASA budgets and cost inflation, 
as with a person’s salary and the cost of goods they buy, are actually two sides of one coin-purchasing power. The 
possible combination of possible budgets, and what outcomes these budgets might be able to afford, can seem 
overwhelming. Exploring the edges of a very big box can simplify things. One attempt at this follows – 
 
“Implementable in the near-term with the buying power of current budgets and in the longer term with budgets 
commensurate with economic growth6” 
 
This analysis will avoid the idea of “economic growth” for an equivalent but simpler approach. When the US gross 
domestic product shrinks, as during a recession, is NASA’s budget cut? What relationship exists between the broader 
economy and the cost of very specific, and often unique, space systems? These economic complications are 
unnecessary to develop significant, useful observations from a simpler exploration of boundaries using purchase 
power scenarios. Three simple, but very useful, scenarios (Table 1) are- 
 
1) High Purchase Power Scenario – Deviates from past trends, for the better. Here, the NASA budget goes up 
at whatever the inflation rate of space systems goods and services may be. As the NASA Inflation Index 
recommends 2.5%, this scenario can assume that starting immediately NASA starts getting 2.5% budget 
increases (on average) for the foreseeable future. The scenario is “optimistic” as this would mean NASA’s 
future budget trend would be special, unlike most other federal agencies. NASA’s purchase power today in 
2015 is the same as NASA’s purchase power in 2025, or 2035. Costs of any space systems today, inflated 
as time goes by, and today’s budgets once increased, remain parallel to each other. 
 
2) Nominal Purchase Power Scenario – Uses quantifiable data. The NASA budget goes up in the years ahead 
as it has in years past, an average of 1.175% a year, with cost inflation as indicated in an official NASA 
source, the NASA Inflation Index, which recommends 2.5%. The nominal scenario continues to lose 
purchase power, but is nominal by relying on data, having no subjectivity as to what may happen. 
Nominally, the future is like the past, as best we understood it. 
 
3) Low Purchase Power Scenario – Deviates from past trends, for the worse. To simplify, inflation in space 
systems good and services may go up faster than 2.5% a year on average, while NASA still receives budget 
increase only on a par with past trends (1.175% a year). To carry the analysis to its end, the analysis here 
does not have to address why cost inflation may be more than 2.5%. (Reasons would include a shrinking 
space systems industrial base, possibly reduced defense spending affecting NASA’s industrial base, 
demographics favoring the prior, etc.) Human Exploration & Operations purchase power in 2025 or 2035, 
would have the power of compound interest working against plans. This means billions less a year in real 
purchase power terms by the 2030’s, even as the real year budget seemed to go up every year. 
 
High Purchase Power Scenario: Average NASA budget 
increases 2016 forward are the same rate as the average 
cost inflation of the exploration & operations goods and 
services. (Both 2.5%). 
Why “High”? A “what-if”, the NASA budget, 
increasing faster than supported by recent historical 
data. 
Nominal Purchase Power Scenario: The NASA budget 
goes up yearly as it has in the past decade (1.175%). 
Cost inflation as officially recommended in the NASA 
Inflation Index (2.5%). 
Why “Nominal”? Both budget and inflation rate 
increases supported by historical trend data or official 
NASA sources. No “what-if”. 
Low Purchase Power Scenario: The cost inflation of 
goods and services required by NASA increases an 
additional 1% above the recommended NASA Inflation 
Index (3.5%). NASA yearly budget increases per recent 
historical data (1.175%). 
Why “Low”? A “what-if”, cost inflation, increasing 
faster than supported by official NASA sources. 
Table 1. Summary low, nominal and high NASA purchase power scenarios. 
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VI. Scenario Variable 2: Post-ISS Budget Availability for Other Exploration 
As with the scenarios about purchase power, post-ISS budget availability scenarios can be simplified as optimistic, 
nominal, and pessimistic (as seen from the viewpoint of follow-up projects, not from the point of view of the ISS). 
The nominal scenario should be a supported by available information, while being more linear, involving less 
subjectivity or “what if”. The optimistic scenario frees up more money, the pessimistic less, within some bounds still 
limited by knowledge about how budgets really behave. These three simpler, but still very useful, scenarios (are- 
 
1) High post-ISS Available Funding Scenario – Frees up the maximum amount of funding post-ISS. Realism 
must still bound this scenario. For example, Mission Operations and Mission Control costs that are currently 
inside the ISS Operations budget would continue. 
 
2) Nominal post-ISS Available Funding Scenario – Uses what information is available. NASA and its 
partners de-orbited the ISS in 2024 -or perhaps NASA upgraded the ISS, privatized it, or made it smaller. As 
well, NASA will be purchasing time on a private space station (or stations) as a (quote) “anchor tenant”7. 
This scenario only needs to plausibly bound budgets, not specific configurations, around the idea that some 
NASA low Earth orbit presence continues after 2024, indefinitely for planning purposes. 
 
3) Low post-ISS Available Funding Scenario – Frees up the least amount of funding for other projects. This 
scenario is similar to the nominal scenario, but the end of the ISS is in 2028, and NASA’s continued presence 
in low Earth orbit requires more funds than if there were greater success in the development of private sector 
stations and their affordability. 
 
High post-ISS 
Available Funding 
Scenario: 
Why “High”? A “what-if”, funding freed-up for other uses post-ISS, disregarding wholly 
the possibility of any continued NASA presence in LEO. 
 
Exception: ISS Operations as with Nominal (Mission Operations & Control). 
 
Sum=$3,100M a year fully available 
Nominal post-ISS 
Available Funding 
Scenario: 
Why “Nominal”? An extrapolation consistent with NASA statements. 
 
ISS Operations: 1/3rd fully available, while other 2/3rds also available, but limited to use for 
(1) Mission Operations & Control for Exploration and (2) Mission Operations & 
Management of NASA personnel aboard private LEO stations. ($400M a year fully 
available) 
 
ISS R&D: Reduced 50% ($150M a year fully available) 
 
ISS Cargo & Crew: Reduced 50% (private stations, NASA as “anchor tenant”); Station 
owner handles in-their space operations and control. Reduction due to either less usage 
and/or bundling/block services consistent with “services”. 
 
Sum=$1,750M a year fully available 
Low post-ISS 
Available Funding 
Scenario: 
Why “Low”? As with Nominal, but “what-if” ISS Cargo & Crew rides and related for a 
private space station in an anchor tenant role are reduced only 1/3rd from current levels. 
R&D remains at the same levels as today, but as NASA work occurring at private sector 
stations. 
 
Sum=$1,500M a year fully available 
Table 2. Summary low, nominal and high post-ISS available funding scenarios. Values are in Fiscal Year 2015 
dollars. 
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VII. Combining Scenario Variables 
While the sums in the post-ISS scenarios may appear inviting, potentially the basis for a NASA lunar, Mars or 
other space exploration initiative beyond low Earth orbit, combining the low, nominal and high post-ISS scenarios 
with the low, nominal and high purchase power scenarios provides a starkly different perspective. 
 
1) The low and nominal post-ISS funding scenarios, combined with the nominal budget/inflation 
scenario, actually frees up zero (or negative) funding by the 2030’s. Purchase power loss will have eroded 
away any possible post-ISS funding, as a slow build-up of budget pressures over time across all NASA 
programs, perhaps manifesting as reduced productivity (outcomes and achievements), with the end of the 
ISS program consistent with the reduction in overall forward progress in exploration. 
 
2) The high post-ISS funding scenarios, combined with the nominal budget/inflation scenario, will free 
up less than $10 billion in funding by the late 2030’s – or less. Purchase power loss will have eroded away 
a significant part of possible funding availability from the end of the ISS program, but not all, in this scenario 
with a high post-ISS funding availability. Alternately, given uncertainty in the industrial base, and assuming 
the low purchase power scenario, all this potential funding would have eroded away as well through purchase 
power losses. 
 
Other combinations are possible, for example, the high post-ISS funding scenario and the high purchase power 
scenario, allowing many 10’s of billions of dollars in funding to be applied to exploration, Mars, etc. in the 2030s. 
Combining NASA purchase power scenarios and the post-ISS scenarios sets the stage for understanding the range of 
budget possibilities in which potential NASA exploration concepts will (or will not) live. The greatest amount of 
purchase power and the greatest amount of funding freed up from the end of the ISS program would provide the 
greatest amount of funding available to proposed Exploration scenarios. The lowest amount of funding comes from 
combining the least purchase power with the least available post-ISS funding. 
The scenarios explored ahead will often combine nominal scenarios for purchasing power and post-ISS available 
funding. The “budget” X “inflation” X “future of ISS” box having been explored for it’s possible edges, the sheets 
ahead delve into individual possibilities, scenarios inside the prior scenarios, to see how well these fit (or not) inside 
the context that will be set by these edges. 
The Life Cycle Cost model8 used to generate the diorama’s ahead, its methodology and mechanics, is not the focus 
of this paper. The emphasis here is on the analytical results from such a model. As background, Figure 4 shows the 
models basic framework. The model is available on request from the author**. A user guide accompanies the model 
taking the user through each step in the user interface, including examples. 
 
                                                          
** Edgar Zapata, NASA Kennedy Space Center, edgar.zapata-1@nasa.gov 
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Figure 4. The framework of the Human Exploration & Operations Scenario Life Cycle Cost Model. Using a 
combination of historical data, subject matter expertise, guidance in the model, and internal calculations, a user 
generates a life cycle cost scenario for a set of elements inside a NASA budget/inflation scenario of their choosing. 
 
Hard cost data from on-going and past projects being so critical to understanding future costs, the LCC model has 
abundant data, from older to recent, from launch systems to spacecraft, from cost-plus to commercial, and from crewed 
to non-crewed (cargo) data points. The data stretches from non-recurring (development) to recurring (manufacture 
and operations). Users uninterested in the LCC model are free to explore and use the data or the data’s sources, 
documented throughout. Data as facts-on-the-ground are critical to analyzing the feasibility of future scenarios within 
the edges set by any “budget” X “inflation” X “future NASA LEO presence” context. By way of example, Figure 5 
summarizes some of the LCC models spacecraft data for development as well as recurring manufacturing costs to 
NASA (industry costs to NASA, exclusive of other costs such as NASA / government management costs, etc.) 
 
 
Figure 5. Summary spacecraft data from the LCC model. Non-recurring development costs (red/dashed), units on 
the right-axis, and recurring manufacturing unit costs (blue/solid), units on the left axis. 
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VIII. Scenario Sheets 
Each scenario sheet ahead will begin with a general description, a storyline of sorts. Is this a scenario where NASA 
returns to the Moon, or Mars, where the SLS is included, with spacecraft X or spacecraft Y? What is the basic premise 
of this future in the multi-verse of possible futures? What guidance or target was used in phasing, scheduling, the cost 
estimates over time? Particularly, is there an attempt to stay below some fixed budget line? 
 
 
Figure 6. Title of Scenario. A description of each scenario. Blanks in the legend are un-used or inapplicable elements 
in the specific scenario. 
 
Settings: Settings will list especially important variables, some being inputs, others outputs, including: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Low, Nominal or High Purchase Power Scenario 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Low, Nominal or High Post-ISS Funding Scenario 
3) IN- Major Elements: List 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     no. 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    no. 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    no., as applies 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        no., as applies 
 
Observations: 
Observations will address how well the scenario adds up against the chosen context, as well as issues the life cycle 
cost graph may not make readily apparent. In addition, note- 
 Flows of Funds, not Elements: Funds for efforts must precede a mission or other milestone completion by some 
time. There may seem to be an odd sequence or flow of elements, fine when seen as funds flowing. 
 Costs vs. Prices: An estimated price from a partner is the cost to NASA reflected in these budget graphs. The 
actual costs incurred by the partner are not relevant here, as the interest is in what NASA would have to budget; 
e.g. a procurement cost for goods or services atop which will rest still other related costs shown (government 
program and project management, or ground operations testing, or mission operations, for example). 
 Overages, Cost Bars Exceeding Blue Lines, Red Lines, etc.: In any scenarios, for example content $ bars 
exceeding the dashed blue line, should be interpreted as challenges for the scenario, in proportion to the overage, 
and usually meaning that either schedule or mission/flight rate capability, or both, will be less than inputted for 
the scenario. (The project cannot actually spend funds that are not there). 
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IX. The Interim Scenario – SLS (& ICPS), Orion - Nominal 
The Baseline Scenario is merely a starting point, an extrapolation of the SLS and Orion in the 70t payload 
configuration. The 70t configuration includes an Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), with this upper stage as 
part of the 70t payload capacity to LEO (and within the SLS costs). In the operational years, launches occur twice a 
year. 
 
 
Figure 7. The Interim Scenario LCC results, with the ICPS. The SLS/Orion in the 70t configuration (with ICPS 
upper stage), as-if carried out indefinitely, launching twice a year after development is completed. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Nominal Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 1.175%/year, Inflation 2.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: SLS (with ICPS), Orion 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     0.5 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    2.0 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    n/a 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        n/a 
 
Observations: 
In practice, after development completes in 2021, operational funding (above the blue line) capable of a steady 
two flights a year must await at least 2025 and the nominal post-ISS funding availability, not 2023. No other funding 
is available in extending this interim scenario for any other purposes than the twice a year launch rate and the post-
ISS LEO presence, which persists in this nominal post-ISS scenario. Although the SLS operational costs are an 
estimate, derived from an analysis of the Space Shuttles fixed and variable costs9, and therefore uncertain, the estimate 
shown is the “low” based on such an extrapolation. This indicates challenges ahead for any interim SLS, nominal 
post-ISS scenario if NASA is to divert funding circa 2024-2028 to the development of new space exploration elements 
(there is no funding left over). 
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X. The Baseline Scenario – SLS (& EUS), Orion – Nominal Purchase Power 
Achieving the intended, higher payload capability of the SLS includes plans for a larger upper stage, an Earth 
Departure Stage (EDS) of a scale consistent with the departure stages required in NASA Mars exploration 
scenarios10,11. This Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) better completes the LCC picture in SLS/Orion scenarios. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The Baseline Scenario LCC results, with the EUS. The SLS/Orion in the larger payload configuration 
(with EUS upper stage), launching twice a year after development is completed. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Nominal Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 1.175%/year, Inflation 2.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: SLS/EUS, Orion 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     0.5 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    2.0 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    n/a 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        n/a 
 
Observations: 
Similar to the prior ICPS scenario, made slightly worse, as the EUS is more expensive that the ICPS in exchange 
for the increased payload capability per launch and the usefulness of this scale upper stage for space exploration 
scenarios, for leaving Earth orbit. 
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XI. The Baseline Scenario – SLS (& EUS), Orion – High Purchase Power 
Purchase power can affect any scenario significantly, the power of compound interest over time. Here that power 
of compounding over time benefits the scenario. In one perspective, the NASA budget only goes up an extra 1.325% 
a year over recent historical trends. In another perspective, the same number means NASA’s budget would be going 
up at over twice the recent historical trend of 1.175% per year. 
 
 
Figure 9. The Baseline Scenario LCC results, with EUS. The SLS/Orion in the larger payload configuration (with 
EUS, the larger upper stage), launching twice a year after development is completed. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: High Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 2.5%/year, Inflation 2.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: SLS/EUS, Orion 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     0.5 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    2.0 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    n/a 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        n/a 
 
Observations: 
Due to increasing the NASA budget at a rate matching cost inflation, the scenario that previously appeared 
challenged now looks more plausible. Given the nominal post-ISS funding scenario, according to this estimate about 
half of the funding freed up post-2024 would be required to support the 2 SLS/Orion launches a year, with the other 
half (under $1B a year) available for the future space exploration elements. Significant challenges remain in this 
scenario – principally the ability to balance the SLS/Orion flight rate, requiring post-ISS funds, and the need to develop 
payloads for these flights, those future exploration elements. With under $1B a year freed up post-ISS for new space 
exploration elements, and the remainder for even one SLS/Orion flight a year, it would be 10 years before a cumulative 
$10B (in 2015 $) was made available to develop and make future space exploration elements. 
  
$0
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
$8,000
$10,000
$12,000
2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035 2037
NASA SLS Develop., NREC NASA SLS Fixed Yearly, REC
NASA SLS Variable per Launch, REC
EDS (EUS or equiv.) Develop., NREC EDS (EUS or equiv.) Manuf., REC Orion Develop., NREC
Orion Fixed Yearly, REC Orion Variable per Launch, REC
Ground/Launch Site Ops Develop., NREC Ground/Launch Site Ops, REC
Government Project Management Government Program Management Indicator Only - Crew Missions START
SLS+Orion+Ground Sys. Budget incl. Gov't Mng'mt ISS Funds All (incl. ISS Ops, incl. Mission Ops) ISS Funds (R&D & Cargo/Crew)
Human Spaceflight Total (w. AES/R&D & SFS)
Life Cycle Costs, RY $M per Year
Cost Bars = All Industry/Procurement+Government as Modeled
Human Exploration & Operations / HEO FY 15 = $7,882M/year.NASA LCC Scenario Model
15 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
XII. The Baseline Scenario – SLS (& EUS), Orion – Low Purchase Power 
Purchase power can affect any scenario significantly, the power of compound interest over time. Here that power 
works against the scenario. While it may seem an unlikely worse case, cost inflation at 3.5%, it’s worth remembering 
this value is for unique aerospace goods and services, space systems in low volumes even relative to historical 
standards (the Space Shuttle flight rate averaged 5 a year). Industrial base challenges12,13 and the uncertainty over the 
inflation rate14 for unique space systems would support such a scenario actually being less than worse case. 
 
Figure 10. The Baseline Scenario LCC results, with an EUS. The SLS/Orion in the larger payload configuration 
(with EUS upper stage), launching twice a year after development is completed. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Low Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 1.175%/year, Inflation 3.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: SLS/EUS, Orion 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     1.0 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    2.0 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    n/a 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        n/a 
 
Observations: 
Besides being a low purchase power scenario, the flight rate for the SLS/Orion, versus previous scenarios, is now 
only one flight/year, not two. (There is insufficient funding for 2 flights/year given the nominal post-ISS funding 
availability scenario, $1,750M in 2015 $, by way of example being $2,500M in 2038). This scenario closes at this 
lower flight rate, leaving some funding in the 2020’s for the development of new space exploration elements, but the 
loss of purchase power eventually erodes this wedge to zero by 2038. 
In addition, the usual issues of violating the blue-line up through 2024 would indicate this scenario faces nearer 
term challenges that could delay the EUS and use of the SLS/Orion before 2025. 
Further, separating guidance on cost inflation from an understanding of actual cost inflation would improve the 
understanding of such scenarios. In NASA, as in the Department of Defense, this separation remains unclear. 
 
“The FMR’s guidance is unclear. It states that a DOD budget submission must “reflect most likely or expected 
full costs.” The next paragraph, however, mandates the use of the OUSD(C)-provided rates.”13 
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XIII. Alternate Scenario 1 – Lunar Exploration via Commercial & In-space Refueling 
A non-linear scenario breaking from the prior baseline could begin with an attempt to back into an architecture 
given the nominal budget/inflation (and ongoing loss of purchase power) alongside the nominal post-ISS scenario for 
funding availability. One such class of scenarios would use refueling in-space, an Earth orbit rendezvous / lunar orbit 
rendezvous architecture, Falcon Heavy, Delta IV Heavy and modified commercial crew spacecraft (the modification 
being to upgrade to lunar and 21-day mission requirements). 
 
Figure 11. Alternate Scenario 1 – Lunar Exploration via Commercial Launchers and In-space Refueling 
Infrastructure. More elements are required, but with redundant providers, just as in current ISS cargo/crew ops. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Nominal Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 1.175%/year, Inflation 2.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: Refueling stage (with a lifetime of 7 years in space), commercial propellant tankers 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     1.0 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    6.0 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    4.0 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        $5,000/kg 
 
Observations: 
The scenario assumes the cancelation of the SLS/Orion programs, freeing up that funding into a major re-direction 
for NASA. The first mission to the Moon occurs in 2023, with the need to collaborate with industry on tankers (akin 
to upper stages), an in-space propellant depot where the commercial tankers deposit propellant, commercial space 
operations, modifications to commercial crew spacecraft for lunar trips, and a new lunar lander.  
This scenario could also segue away from what would become repetitive trips to the Moon by 2030, morphing in 
assorted directions dependent on learning, the establishment of in-space infrastructure and the degree to which 
delivered propellant costs could go lower. 
Conservative values have been used for launcher prices to NASA (which are above any advertised rates), as well 
as for most items. For example, the assumption is made a modification to commercial crew spacecraft would entail as 
much development cost again as the entire development of these initially (also see Figure 5) for the ISS mission-an 
extremely conservative estimate. 
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XIV. Alternate Scenario 1 – Same as Prior, but Falcon Heavy Prices across Redundant Providers 
As these life cycle views are funds flows for NASA acquiring certain outcomes alongside contractors and/or 
partners, it’s possible to keep the redundant provider proviso in these commercial launcher/tanker scenarios while 
assuming two such providers at prices nearer the possible low-end. The funds flow looks no different from having one 
provider, but the scenario costs are lower, driven by the achievement of the propellant costs, a sum of the tankers and 
their launchers, losses, operational costs for the refueling node, and the replacement of these over time. 
 
Figure 12. Alternate Scenario 1 – Lunar Exploration via Commercial Launchers and In-space Refueling 
Infrastructure. Assuming prices per kg at the lower end of possible costs, and two providers, leaves ample margin. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Nominal Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 1.175%/year, Inflation 2.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: Refueling stage (with a lifetime of 7 years in space), commercial propellant tankers 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     1.0 (meaning 1 mission every 12 months) 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    5.0 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    3.0 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        $3,000/kg 
 
Observations: 
Events such as a new partnership (with NASA again using the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services / COTS 
development and service acquisition model) or current events such as the evolution of the United Launch Alliance 
Vulcan15 launchers would be consistent with this scenario. The scenario is missing development of the second 
providers launcher but this would not significantly affect the LCC (and would barely show) if close to repeating the 
experience of the ISS cargo program. 
More significantly, this scenario opens the door to viewing the blue-line as a funding limit for transportation and 
propellant for the future elements to come in exploration. Given the nominal post-ISS funding scenario, this case 
shows ample margin (it has used none of the $1,750M a year freed up post-ISS) to segue into an assortment of 
directions after 2024-2028, increasing the mission tempo, or developing and placing new elements of exploration 
infrastructure on the Moon. This could segue in turn towards Mars (discussed further ahead). 
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XV. Alternate Scenario 1 – Same as Prior, But Semi-Reusable Launch 
Semi-reusable launch, for example, the reusable Falcon 9 first stage in development16, or as proposed with the 
recovery of propulsion modules17 from future Vulcan launchers, offers a path to even lower launch costs, affecting 
the acquisition price of propellant delivered to an in-space refueling node. Again, provided this opens a path to more 
than just one provider at the prices supported by extrapolating current launch prices to NASA, alongside the in-space 
refueling costs (the refueling point in space, it’s operation, etc.) tempo can now be increased to two a year. 
 
Figure 13. Alternate Scenario 1 – Lunar Exploration via Commercial Launchers and In-space Refueling 
Infrastructure. The tempo increases over the prior, employing lower price semi-reusable launch services. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Nominal Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 1.175%/year, Inflation 2.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: Refueling stage (with a lifetime of 7 years in space), commercial propellant tankers 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     0.5 (meaning 1 mission every 6 months) 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    10 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    3.0 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        $2,400/kg 
 
Observations: 
Uncertainties here begin with the interaction of lowering a price by recovering a stage versus losing some 
performance, and hence propellant delivery capability, or increasing the total launches over a time, arising industrial, 
range and other capacity issues. Nonetheless, the scenario is intriguing in its ability to remain within the nominal 
budget/inflation assumption (NASA continues losing purchase power) and the nominal post-ISS funding availability 
scenario. 
This scenario can develop other elements initially as well, given the margin at the start of this scenario, even with 
generous consideration for the crewed lunar lander development, enough to support two lunar lander partner/providers 
in a commercial acquisition model. The lower launch prices, for simple cargo (propellant), in a block or “anchor 
tenancy” mode, again opens the door to either lunar exploration, infrastructure, or a combination that later helps either 
the economics or performance for Mars exploration. 
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XVI. Alternate Scenario 2 – In-Space Refueling and Asteroid Missions 
Figure 14 shows a non-linear scenario that shifts gears to explore asteroids, again using refueling. As the timing 
of asteroid missions is rather complex, dependent on locating scientifically valuable and physically reachable targets, 
reachable being constrained by any chosen architectures capabilities, the scenario mostly helps reflect on other 
scenarios, such as Mars, that may have similar performance requirements of launchers and their Earth departure stages. 
 
 
Figure 14. Alternate Scenario 2 – In-space Refueling, Commercial Launchers and Asteroids. More elements are 
required (a habitat, an in-space exploration vehicle, etc.) as well as the larger Earth Departure Stage. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Nominal Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 1.175%/year, Inflation 2.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: Refueling stage (with a lifetime of 7 years in space), commercial propellant tankers 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     1.5 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    6.0 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    6.0 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        $4,700/kg 
 
Observations: 
The example for this scenario above includes redundant launch providers, just as in current ISS cargo/crew ops. 
While appearing similar to an SLS/Orion scenario that would explore an asteroid in the 2020’s18, similar to the 2028 
date in this scenario, a key difference is completing the development of many exploration elements that are key to 
many an exploration scenario, before any consideration of the fate of the ISS, before the 2024/2028 timeframe. 
As well, one element developed in this scenario (but necessary at only about half scale in the lunar scenarios) 
would be an Earth Departure Stage. This would perform a function just as in SLS/Orion scenarios and the EUS (but 
at about twice scale). This departure stages development is common, perhaps with the same provider, with much of 
the refueling station’s design, to maintain the manufacturing capability for refueling station replacements, when 
required according to their life limits. Figure 18 and Figure 19 contrast the scales involved in these Earth departure 
stages, where smaller stages (lunar scale) are mated in-space to perform the same missions (asteroids, Mars) as larger 
scale stages. 
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XVII. “What-if” Scenario – SLS/EUS, Orion and a Mars “What-if 13/2.5” 
Using the concept that a “what-if” life cycle view merely needs to see “that which remains” of budget, after 
defining those elements better understood now, a life cycle cost view of a Mars DRA 5.0 type scenario is possible. 
Assuming a $13.5 billion development for Mars mission elements excluding transportation to LEO (SLS, Orion), and 
$2.5 billion per Mars mission element set after, again excluding transportation, yields the life cycle costs in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15. “What-if” Scenario – SLS, Orion and Mars. The “what-if” development and recurring costs of Mars 
elements such as habitat, logistics modules, landers (descent/ascent), etc. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Nominal Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 1.175%/year, Inflation 2.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: SLS/EUS, Orion, Mars Elements as “what-if” (defined only as $ develop, make, etc.) 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     4.5 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    2 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    n/a 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        n/a 
 
Observations: 
In its nominal mode, this “what-if” fails, using more funding than is available post-ISS, especially in 2025 to 2034. 
However, in the post-ISS scenario of maximum funds availability, the scenario does nearly close. Alternately, to fit a 
nominal post-ISS funds availability scenario, the “what-if” development phase would stretch further. Given the desire 
to have the first Mars mission within 20 years though, the required phasing of the “what-if” values of 13/2.5 are 
consistent. 
The frequency of missions is about twice a decade. It is undefined what the SLS/Orion system are used for during 
the years 2022 (post development completion) through 2032 (the start of a Mars campaign), excepting that the 
development of Mars elements (habitat, etc.) would naturally include some integrated test flights with the SLS – the 
test elements are the SLS payloads. An advanced booster for the SLS as proposed19 would be an additional cost, 
perhaps using funds from the post-ISS $13.5 billion for development (a large uncertainty). 
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XVIII.  “What-if” Scenario – In-Space Refueling and a Mars “What-if - 13/2.5” 
Again, a non-linear scenario breaking from the prior Mars-via-SLS could begin with an attempt to back into an 
architecture given the nominal budget/inflation (and ongoing loss of purchase power) alongside the nominal post-ISS 
scenario for funding availability. One such class of scenarios would use refueling in-space, Falcon Heavy and Delta 
IV Heavy, and modified commercial crew spacecraft (the modification being to upgrade to Orion equivalent mission 
requirements). As previously set, the Mars in-space element costs and the mission frequency are the same. 
 
Figure 16. “What-if” Scenario – Tankers, Refueling of Earth Departure Stages and Commercial Launch. 
Providers deliver propellant to a LEO refueling station. Earth departure stages and their ship leave full for Mars. 
 
Settings: 
1) IN- Budget/Inflation: Nominal Purchase Power Scenario (Budget 1.175%/year, Inflation 2.5%/year) 
2) IN- Post-ISS Scenario: Nominal Post-ISS Funding Scenario ($1,750M/year available post-2024) 
3) IN- Major Elements: Refueling stage / tankers, Mars Elements as “what-if” (defined only as $ develop, make, etc.) 
4) IN- Frequency of missions, every X years:     4.5 
5) OUT- Number of any launches per year, average:    7.1 
6) OUT- Number of tanker launches, per mission:    23 
7) OUT- Propellant (LO/LH) $/kg:        $4,200 
 
Observations: 
The scenario again assumes the cancelation of the SLS/Orion programs, freeing up that funding into a major re-
direction for NASA. Assuming the same Mars mission elements and their life cycle costs, the first mission to Mars 
occurs in 2030. NASA would need to collaborate with industry on tankers, a propellant depot in-space, commercial 
space operations, modifications to commercial crew spacecraft for cis-lunar capability, and Mars elements from 
habitats to landers and their Mars ascent (crew) vehicles. 
As shown above, the scenario works not only with the nominal post-ISS funding scenario, but also with a near 
zero-post-ISS funding availability, opening the door to an assortment of other scenarios. These other scenarios could 
be merely margin for the scenario shown, a faster mission tempo (faster than every 4.5 years, re-approaching the 26 
month DRA 5.0 cycles), extending mission stays on Mars, private sector space station partnerships, infrastructure on 
the Moon or Mars and others. 
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Figure 17: A Propellant Depot at a scale of an Earth departure stage applicable to a Design Reference 
Architecture 5.0 type Mars missions, among others20. The commonality between a propellant depot and a cryogenic 
propulsion stage (CPS) would reduce their development costs while also having the basic manufacturing capability 
always active, through ongoing production of Earth departure stages, for when the depot requires replacement at the 
end of its design life. 
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Figure 18. Example of using a smaller (EUS scale) upper stage as an Earth departure stage, for trans-Mars 
injection21. Though the surge approach to the launch scenario is not explored here, the basic cargo/crew ships and 
their tonnage inform the “What-if” Mars scenarios, but using a larger stage as in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19. Example of using a larger upper stage as an Earth departure stage, for trans-Mars injection22. 
Note how now one stage replaces each of the two in each leg of the mission compared to Figure 18. 
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XIX. Points of Departure and Partnering 
By way of addressing the importance of considering “how” NASA contracts, acquires or collaborates (a make, 
buy, or partner decision) for future space exploration, a return to the spacecraft data in Figure 5 alongside the Mars 
scenarios (Figure 15 and Figure 16) is necessary. Relatively recent experience with the NASA Commercial Orbital 
Transportation Services (COTS) / Cargo Resupply Services (CRS) acquisition approach showed the possibility of 
significantly lowering development and operational costs of complex space systems. The NASA Commercial Crew 
Program is also applying elements of this approach in its acquisition. 
Across all the scenarios considered, multiple new elements will be necessary for NASA’s space exploration. Many 
of these new elements are cargo and crew spacecraft of some sort, as well as propulsion stages –putting aside the 
transportation of these to space or how these would depart Earth or it’s vicinity for the Moon or Mars. Minimally, 
these exploration elements would include- 
 
 Landers, emplacing cargo, or a return / ascent spacecraft, for crew to leave a planetary surface 
 Habitats in-space, for cargo as well as for crew, the “ship’s quarters” per se to Mars 
 In-space exploration vehicles, much like crew spacecraft, but with additional flexibility 
 More propulsion stages (for Earth departure, to return from Mars, etc.) 
 In-situ Resource Utilization facilities on the Moon or Mars 
 Rovers once on a planetary surface 
 Habitats on a planetary surface, depending on the stay time 
 And elements not yet envisioned or variants of the prior 
 
Any ONE of these prior crewed elements, if it were to repeat a development cost close to Orion (a $16 billion 
dollar procurement cost to NASA, development only, exclusive of other government management costs, through 2021, 
in 2015 $ - Figure 5) would require- 
 
 Over 5 Years of post-ISS funding in the high post-ISS available funding scenario 
 
 Over 9 Years of post-ISS funding in the nominal post-ISS available funding scenario 
 
 Over 10 Years of post-ISS funding in the low post-ISS available funding scenario 
 
-with all the remaining elements yet to be developed. 
 
Clearly, as with the elements such as landers in all scenario’s here, “how” an element is acquired by NASA, 
ranging from cost-plus to commercial, with other non-technical decisions (as a service, with redundant developers, as 
well as providers, aligning incentives) will be a cost driver in all exploration scenarios – lunar, asteroids, Mars or 
beyond. Traditionally, this was not an emphasis. Most NASA cost models ignore most costs, in the sense that there is 
little attention on the outcome of indirect partner costs, which are the majority of costs, or these are simply “wrapped” 
according to some rate after an emphasis on defining “what”, the technical factors such as a design, technology or 
requirements. 
The basis of estimate of elements placed into some NASA purchase power and post-ISS funding scenario that can 
feasibly accomplish space exploration in relevant timeframes will by necessity have to place as much emphasis on 
outcomes about “how” (partner efficiency, innovation, and process/practices), if not more, than outcomes about 
“what” (design of elements). Evidence suggests that “what” does not have to drag or determine “how” and an army 
of labor costs, but rather that “how” should give rise to what” - the best design and specification is an output of an 
efficient and innovative set of processes and practices. The area of cost improvements possible requires more research. 
Initial indications are improvement factors for launcher developments, which should reflect on propulsion stages in 
general, such as Earth Departure Stages, are gains on the order of  >10X less development cost23 to NASA, and 
prices for launch to NASA ~4-5X less than traditional. These factors would be suspect if the only existence proof 
was a single launch system, but as shown in Figure 5, similar improvement factors would apply to complex crew 
spacecraft. SpaceHab, a program farther back, documented a similar improvement factor24 (10X). 
By the numbers, this prior observation is somewhat trivial. In the high post-ISS funding scenario there would be 
$38 billion dollars in funding available through 2038 (2015 $). A trivial observation is that this dollar amount cannot 
be spent on two cost-plus crewed spacecraft acquisitions (a crewed lander and a crewed habitat for example), leaving 
the rest undone. The more challenging question will be in locating the line where COTS/CRS-like or Commercial 
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Crew Program-like partnering may not achieve cost advantages in development and operations as with these prior 
programs. Locating that line is critical as a default decision to proceed with more traditional cost-plus acquisition 
strategies bakes a potentially unaffordable layer into already uncertain scenarios. All the points of departure for all the 
elements listed previously, must assume some more efficient acquisition process, closer to the COTS/CRS and 
Commercial Crew program experience, by default, undone only by actual experience to the contrary after forming 
element acquisition programs on this assumption (lack of viable partners, lack of progress on milestones, etc.). 
XX. “All Our Models Say No” – and Recommendations 
 
All the scenarios explored the possible edges of a scenario box, edges set by NASA’s purchasing power and 
NASA’s post-ISS presence in low Earth orbit. The scenarios also explored the potential contents of this box. Scenarios 
can- 
 
 Change context: Make the box bigger, as in Figure 9, with a high purchasing power scenario, NASA budgets 
increasing on a par with any inflation, and the most possible post-ISS funding diverted to Mars exploration. 
 
 Change content: Change what goes in the exploration box for Mars (or the Moon, etc.), canceling this or that 
program, redirecting to a new architecture, destination or approach. The record shows this has occurred at 
times25. 
 
Although scenarios other than baseline scenarios (SLS/Orion, etc.) were referred to as non-linear, it is arguable 
that both extremes, making the box far bigger, or dramatically changing what goes in the box, are equally non-linear 
– each is a challenging leap in its own way. Changing the edges of the box asks that NASA be isolated from the 
pressures of the federal budget, as well as many other factors (political, societal, demographic, etc.) affecting federal 
agencies. Changing the contents of the box is asking to disconnect NASA from past processes and relationships with 
industry and stakeholders, then reconnecting to new processes and relationships. Changing all the context asks the 
whole outside world to change, while changing all the content asks the whole world inside NASA to change. 
In reference to just part of the elements of an exploration program beyond low Earth orbit, it has been noted that- 
 
“All our models say ‘no,’ ” said Elizabeth Robinson, NASA’s chief financial officer, “even models that have 
generous affordability considerations.” 26 
 
Making the box bigger would seem to have the benefit of being a choice supported by facts on the ground, existing 
facilities and programs. This is changing one variable, context, with contents unchanged. The option of changing 
contents would also have facts on the ground, budget outlooks, existing pressures and fiscal realities. This is changing 
one variable, contents, with context unchanged - accepting budget realities. 
This begs the question marking the end of many a meeting – how to think outside the box? All the scenarios have 
assorted features in common that point to potentially significant answers here. As each bar in each scenario is a need 
for funds – how can NASA reduce the height of these $ bars in any scenario while increasing its mission rate (cargo 
and crew yearly tonnage beyond Earth orbit) and expanding its capabilities (being in low Earth orbit, and the Moon, 
and Mars, and beyond)?  
Significant, common factors offering significant improvements across ALL scenarios are- 
 
1) Require all future Points of Departure for new elements be partnerships 
 
As pointed out previously, and separately due to its importance, the Points of Departure of a future program, its 
starting assumption about the directions for the acquisition of multiple exploration elements from landers to injection 
stages, to insertion stages, to logistics modules and habitats, must begin with partnerships. 
These partnerships should be similar to the recent ISS commercial cargo and crew programs. While there is no 
guarantee of repeating similar improvements in life cycle costs for new exploration elements, alternative Points of 
Departure that are more traditional (cost-plus, and related characteristics), baked into life cycle graphs via a basis of 
estimate, simply won’t fit any scenarios – even the most optimistic of high budget, low inflation, and high post-ISS 
funding. 
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Improvements in life cycle costs, from 10X to 5X, are a necessity for starters, in setting any initial content, the 
bars in the life cycle graphs, for any scenarios ahead, and such cost factor improvements have only been demonstrated 
when NASA undertakes commercial-like partnerships in acquiring goods and services. An emphasis on partnerships 
with significant cost improvements is consistent with staying ahead on the matter of purchase power, keeping the cost 
inflation rate within a purchase power scenario below any rate of budget growth – in effect increasing purchase power 
without the need for increased budgets. In addition, multiple partnerships as multiple providers can address risks from 
(1) the capacity limits of any one provider, avoiding exceeding any one provider’s capacity, (2) element failures, 
reducing mission (campaign) risk where redundant launchers, spacecraft or services apply27, and (3) misaligned 
incentives, creating a more competitive environment that aligns incentives near and far between NASA and providers. 
While any particular new space system elements acquisition process may discover an initial lack of maturity in the 
ability of industry partners to develop and provide systems for NASA needs, this acquisition process would assume 
an investor mindset, rather than a purely engineering mindset. The acquisition process would consider the task of 
maturing industry capabilities as simply part of the process, the only means consistent with far term, dramatically 
improved, cost goals for the new elements required in NASA missions, if these are to achieve exploration outcomes 
in any budget scenarios. 
 
2) Require productivity goals that continuously go up, not down 
 
Reducing the height of any life cycle bars in a scenario, the $ amounts, is possible by doing less. Mars design 
reference missions circa 2009/2010 studied crew departures to Mars every two years28. In a paradigm of NASA yearly 
project budgets, it is not difficult to predict yearly costs – yearly costs are uncannily close to what funding an analyst 
knows may be available. The challenge in estimating costs is in calculating benefits. Cost are well constrained, benefits 
are to be determined. A benefit is a development’s completion by some date, an operational capability sometime in 
the future, a flight, mission, milestone, acquisition or other rate capability achieved on a steady basis. Scenarios that 
reduce the productivity of content, such as missions to Mars every 4.5 years (Figure 15, Figure 16) to attempt to fit 
into a scenario box (budget, etc.), are heading the wrong way. 
Pioneering is very distinct from exploring. 
 
Explore: (as a transitive verb) 1a) to investigate, study, or analyze: look into, 1b) to become familiar with by 
testing or experimenting. 2) To travel over (new territory) for adventure or discovery. 3) To examine especially 
for diagnostic purposes. As an intransitive verb: to make or conduct a systematic search. 
Pioneering: 1) being among those who first enter a region, in order to open it for use and development by 
others. 2) being one of a group that builds and prepares infrastructure precursors, in advance of others. 
 
“Pioneering” life cycle cost scenarios must by definition be about developments and infrastructure in advance of 
others, permanence and growth, and not merely a visit. While some scenarios explored previously may set the stage 
for pioneering, by exploring, these scenarios do not directly address pioneering in our solar system. 
Pioneering is consistent with taking the cost improvements pointed out previously as necessary, factors of 10X 
and 5X, even further. True pioneering scenarios have to push toward mission rates and capabilities measured in 
missions per year, not years between missions. While exploration paves the way for pioneering, pioneering by 
definition an evolution to a transition29, away from government dominated activity to non-government and private 
sector entities. The costs and rate of the activity must be consistently improved to be consistent with eventual non-
government, self-sustaining economic activities.  
 
3) Require NASA acquisitions to favor systems and partners that also grow non-NASA business 
 
Factor 1, partnerships, is consistent with the growth paradigm of Factor 2, pioneering and productivity. Combining 
these, the need to increase the tempo of systems being developed, manufactured and operated, may be achieved by 
integrating NASA mission needs alongside customers beyond NASA’s limited government missions. Adding the 
requirement that systems and partners preferred by NASA be those systems and partners that mature private sector, 
non-NASA, business cases, other customers, opens the door to the life cycle improvements beyond factors of 10X to 
5X required for pioneering. The amortization of fixed company costs, faster learning due to higher volume of 
manufacturing, or tempo of operations, and efficient company process/practices (competitive pricing), a requirement 
from the non-government customers, as incentive for the company business case, are all part of this factor, benefitting 
NASA’s element acquisitions. 
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This economics acquisition strategy, setting a strong decision factor for selecting partners, for lowering the height 
of cost $ bars in a NASA life cycle scenario while simultaneously increasing mission rate, will require an investment 
mind-set on the part of selecting officials. This is a necessary ingredient without which life cycle cost scenarios, merely 
by the numbers, and regardless of NASA budgets over the next generation, cannot conceivably pioneer the solar 
system. 
 
4) Require increasing reusability of elements 
 
Another path to lowering the height of cost $ bars in a NASA exploration / pioneering life cycle scenarios, is not 
to add so many bars – for repeatedly making and launching things. Reusing an item already in space, not having to 
manufacture another unit, while also avoiding its launch costs, is a path to fitting more elements and their content into 
any budget scenarios, sooner. For Mars exploration scenarios candidates, habitats and related crew systems (the “ship” 
to Mars per se) should draw immediate attention for reusability, with the reuse of other elements from stages to 
spacecraft analyzed as well. 
This item could especially benefit from Factor 1, partnerships, as control centers for more in-space activities with 
reusable elements, from traffic management to maintenance, would benefit from efficiencies akin to commercial 
satellite operations. 
 
5) Develop refueling capabilities and infrastructure 
 
A Mars exploration vessel, or other ships (lunar, asteroids, etc.), stages or landers, to increase reuse across more 
than one mission, would require refueling in some manner. This could be via intermediary depots or by direct transfer 
from tanker vessels. Given other potential uses, this direction would also offer paths consistent with Factor 3, favoring 
partner investments toward potential non-government business cases. 
 
6) Mars (and the solar system) via the Moon, ISRU 
 
Partnerships, increasing NASA mission rates, non-government business cases, reusability, and refueling may all 
come together in scenarios that push out into the solar system uses resources along the way. Lunar in-situ resource 
utilization (ISRU) could provide commodities such as LOX and LH2 to Mars missions assembling, preparing and 
refueling near the Moon. Reusable landers from the Moon, as tankers for lunar refueling stations providing propellant 
to Mars missions, might address Factors 3 (non-NASA business cases), Factor 4 (reusability), and Factor 5 (refueling). 
XXI. Conclusions 
This analysis has demonstrated the possibilities and importance of merging context and content, made possible via 
cost modeling and scenario analysis. This has been about numbers, estimated costs and budgets, and how these may 
add-up, or not, in diverse NASA space exploration scenarios. It is also about scenario planning, showing a way to 
avoid the tension between the details and numbers for specific paths and being overwhelmed when stepping back to 
consider all the possibilities. 
Future applications will mature this capability and develop more scenarios, emphasizing the recommendations that 
emerged from looking across the multi-verse of possible scenarios for NASA and its future in space exploration. 
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